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Abstract: 
 
General jurisprudence conceives the courtroom as a space of adjudication and justice 
far removed from the gravitational field of politics. Both in its normative inscription 
and function, the court is conceived as a site of truth and justice elevated above and 
beyond the expediency of power and politics. However, despite the predominance of 
this normative meaning, courts have been used to advance persecutive forms of politics 
that had nothing to do with the determination of guilt and innocence or the pursuit of 
justice. In this article, we will explore the role of the Ethiopian judiciary in legitimizing 
and rationalizing the politics of repression and elimination under the guise of law and 
legality. Drawing on Otto Kirchheimer’s seminal work on the political trial, we will 
examine Ethiopia’s strategic deployment of the judicial space and the devices of justice 
to produce narratives and generate ‘truths’ in the image of the ruling party. 
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Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at 
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity 
installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from 
domination to domination. 
     
—Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 1971 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1994, Ethiopia adopted a new constitution, inaugurating a unique constitutive 
instrument that represented a radical departure with the country’s past.1 The constitution 
inaugurated a new mode of being and new systems of discourses that radically reoriented 
the form and structure of the Ethiopian state. It instituted self-constituting and regulating 
ethno-national states, establishing a federal state structure in which federating units enjoy 
a sovereign status and the unqualified right to self-determination including secession. 
What was once a fiercely centralized unitary state was reconstituted as a decentralized 
                                                          
1
 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 1/1995, 8 December 
1994. 
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multi-national state in which ethnicity and ethnic nationalism acquired a normative status, 
becoming the principal mode of political organizing and mobilization.  
 
Contra the three previous constitutions, the new constitution entrenched human rights and 
fundamental freedoms à la Universal Declaration of Human Rights and proclaimed the 
rule of law and democracy as the constitutive and regulative principles of the new 
Ethiopia. From a constitutional point of view, the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia constitution did more than just institute a new normative-institutional paradigm: 
it reconfigured dominant modes of thought and forms of knowledge that organize and 
structure the Ethiopian state. However, despite these constitutional promises for a break 
with the oppressive practices of the past, Ethiopia remained a fiercely repressive and 
authoritarian state.
2
 Instead of defending and protecting citizens, the Constitution became 
the primary discursive instrument mobilized by the regime to suppress and marginalize 
the very people it promised to liberate.
3
  
 
In this article, we want to consider one of the vital instruments of power rationalization 
and order legitimization constantly mobilized by the Ethiopian government: political 
show trials. In Ethiopia today, political show trials constitute the second most important 
weapon of order preservation and consolidation only after the military-security apparatus. 
Though the turn to the judicial apparatus and the devices of justice to eliminate political 
foes was limited to certain categories of individuals until the 2005 elections, the last 
decade saw a frightening normalization and institutionalization of political show trials. 
From the Red Terror Trials
4
 to the trial of the then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne
5
 and ex-
Defense Minister Siye Abreha
6
, from the Treason Trial
7
 to the trial of Bekele Gerba and 
Olbana Lelisa
8
, from the trial of prominent journalist Eskindir Nega to the trial of the 
                                                          
2
 See Freedom House, Ethiopia, 2014 Country Report; Human Rights Watch, One Hundred Ways of 
Putting Pressure, 24 March 2010; Human Rights Watch, Journalism Is not A Crime: Violations of Media 
Freedoms in Ethiopia, 22 January 2015.  
3
 Merara Gudina, Elections and Democratization in Ethiopia, 1991-2010, 5(4) Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, (2012), 664-66; Awol Allo and Abadir M. Ibrahim, Redefining Protest in Ethiopia: What 
Happens to the Terror Narrative When Muslims call for a Secular State, Open Democracy, 23 October 
2012. 
4
 The Red Terror Trial refers to the trial of government officials responsible for perpetrating atrocities 
during Ethiopia’s Red Terror era. For a useful genealogy of the Red Terror, see Pietro Toggia, The 
Revolutionary Endgame of Political Power: the Genealogy of ‘Red Terror’ in Ethiopia, 10 (3) African 
Identities, (2010), 270-73. 
5
 Tamrat Layne was Prime Minister of Ethiopia from June 1991 to August 1995 in the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (TGE). After a coerced public confession in Parliament, he was tried for abuse 
of power and corruption and jailed for 12 years in what was condemned by the human rights community 
as a politically motivated trial. 
6
 Siye Abreha was Defense Minister of Ethiopia from 1991 to 2002. Following a bitter split within the 
Tigrean Peoples’ Revolutionary Front, he was accused of abuse of power and corruption and subjected to 
a political show trial by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s faction.  
7
 The Treason Trial is a trial of 129 individuals including leaders of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
party following the disputed 2005 elections. The accused were charged with treason, attempted genocide, 
outrage against the constitution, and several other state crimes.  
8
 Bekele Gerba and Olbana Lelisa were members of the opposition parties Oromo Federalist Democratic 
Movement and the Oromo People’s Congress respectively. They were accused of working with the 
Oromo Liberation Front, considered a terrorist organization by Addis Ababa, and for meeting with 
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‘Arbitration Committee of 17’ 9  and several other journalists, bloggers, activists, and 
members of the opposition; one observes a discerning use of the law and the devices of 
justice to pursue repressive political ends: ‘the courts eliminate foes of the regime in 
accordance with prearranged rules.’10 As a result, “the country now holds the shameful 
distinction of having the second-most journalists in exile in the world, after Iran.”11 
The article proceeds in four stages. Drawing on key texts on political trials, Part I offers a 
brief conceptual account of the political trial and its productive and repressive 
architectures. Part II will analyze some of the salient features of Ethiopia’s political trials. 
Part III will identify some of the key changes that have been introduced following the 
2005 elections and how these changes have shaped the government’s mobilization of the 
courts as weapons of order preservation. Finally, Part IV will explore some of the 
prominent political trials of the last two decades with the view to exposing the insidious 
functions of the Ethiopian judiciary: rationalizing, justifying, authenticating, 
consolidating and ultimately preserving relations that are not of equality and sovereignty 
but of domination and inequality between the various political forces within the Ethiopian 
body-politic. 
 
I. Political Trials as Legal Technologies of Domination  
 
Trials are performative legal events capable of concealing and camouflaging the real 
issue at the heart of the social and political conflict they adjudicate. As John Griffith 
writes, “The political neutrality of the judiciary is a myth, one of those fictions our rulers 
delight in, because it confuses and obscures. […] The judiciary does not of course call its 
prejudices political or moral or social. It calls them the public interest.”12 By re-casting 
inherently political conflicts into legally understandable and articulable categories, and 
by situating contingent and contestable political issues within the framework of the rule 
of law and justice, trials conceal the political motive behind irreducibly political conflicts. 
In ‘Democracy in America,’ Alexis de Tocqueville encapsulates the concealing power of 
the judicial apparatus:  
 
“It is a strange thing what authority the opinion of mankind generally grants to the 
intervention of courts. It clings even to the mere appearance of justice long after the 
substance has evaporated; it lends bodily form to the shadow of the law.”  
 
The notion of the political trial is not a distinctively modern phenomenon. From the 
ancient Greece to the Roman antiquity, from the medieval period to modernity and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Amnesty International researchers. See Amnesty International Report, “Ethiopian Opposition Leaders 
Detained After Meeting with Our Delegates”, 31 August 2011.    
9
 Eskinder Nega is a prominent journalist known for writing critical commentaries about the Ethiopian 
government. He was accused of terrorism and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment following what can 
only be described as an authentic political show trial.  
10
 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: the Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 6. 
11
 The Washington Post, Ethiopia’s Stifled Press, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
crackdown-in-ethiopia/2015/02/08/ad1e6bce-abef-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html, (Accessed 15 
February 2015). 
12
 John Griffith, The Politics of Judiciary, New Statesmen, 4 February 1977. 
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postmodernity, in both autocratic and democratic states, the courtroom has been deployed 
as strategic instrument to vindicate and legitimize established authorities. The use of the 
judicial space as a technology of power—as instruments of order preservation, 
vindication, rationalization, or authentication—is as old as the birth of Western 
philosophy. Indeed, the most famous and the first recorded political trial in history is the 
trial of Socrates. Accused of “failing to acknowledge the gods” of the city and 
“introducing new deities” by the Athenian Assembly, the founder of Western philosophy 
stood trial in 399 BC and sentenced to death. Athenians legally eliminated a transgressive 
subject who contested the norm and exceeded ‘the limit’.13 
 
In his nearly definitive account of the political trial, Otto Kirchheimer distinguishes 
between three types of political trials. The first is what may be called the trial of a 
political criminal “involving a common crime committed for political purposes.”14 The 
offense in question is committed out of a purely political reason either to make a political 
point or with the view to use the trial as a platform from which to spell out the political 
considerations behind the offense.
15
 The second is what he calls the “classic political 
trial” in which a regime ‘attempts to incriminate its foes public behavior with a view to 
evicting him from the political scene.”16 The third is “the derivative political trial” in 
which the devices of law and justice (such as defamation, perjury, and various forms of 
civil proceedings) are strategically used with the goal of embarrassing, demonizing, or 
delegitimizing a political foe. The judicial machinery is activated not with the view to 
determine guilt and innocence, but to attain a political end – to undermine or strengthen 
existing power positions within the body politic.
17
 Regardless of the instrument used or 
the political objective pursued, what distinguishes the political trial proper and gives it its 
distinctive color is the direct involvement of the judicial apparatus in struggles over 
power relations.  
 
In Kirchheimer’s schema, the political trial is a complex juridico-political enterprise that 
produces and generates consequences central to the operation of modern techniques of 
power. It is not merely a blunt instrument of repression and elimination but also a 
productive assemblage: it produces strategic knowledge of power that generates power 
effects of various forms. For him, court intervention in political struggle far exceeds the 
determination of guilt and innocence or the simple question of elimination.
18
 When 
“court action is called upon to exert influence on the distribution of political power,” 
there is often something far more significant than the mere elimination of the adversary. 
When laws are selectively mobilized and courts are enlisted to eliminate regime 
adversaries, they not only eliminate, but, most fundamentally, delineate the juridico-
political field within which domination and resistance interact.  
 
                                                          
13
 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates, (3
rd
 ed.) trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2000), 2. 
14
 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 46. 
15
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 46. 
16
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 46 
17
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 49. 
18
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 49. 
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While elimination is the most salient function of the political trial, far more important are 
the technologies of knowledge production and image generation at work in every political 
trial. Behind the processes of adjudication lay the authentication and vindication of the 
political order that benefit hugely from the trial’s superior quality of truth generation and 
image formation. For those who control the reign of justice and the prosecutorial 
machinery, this is a rewarding discursive space that eliminates adversaries of the regime 
while producing ideas and concepts in their image. In his genealogical reading of 
sovereignty, Michel Foucault critiques the discourse of rights and the judiciary apparatus 
in no uncertain terms: The court's essential function is to constitute, to organize, a space 
for the daily and permanent display of royal power in all its splendour.”  Of the rights 
discourse, he says,  
the essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to dissolve the 
element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be 
reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one 
hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other.” 19  
The courts play a strategic role not only because they limit political action but also 
because they are the system’s reservoirs of truth. The rights discourse provides the raw 
material necessary to rationalize, justify, and ultimately erase domination and inequality 
from being recognized and contested. As the radical lawyer William Kunstler once 
observed, every tyrant learns that spectacles of law and legality – judicial theater, 
injunctions, confessions, convictions, and prisons – produce and disseminate hegemonic 
discourses far more effective than the swords of the executioner.
20
  
But the political trial has a potential for subversive interventions as well. For those 
usurped off their voice and intelligibility as speaking beings, and those deprived of the 
means of narrative production; the political trial provides an alternative space for 
contestation and struggle.
21
 There is a spatial and temporal openness that makes a given 
concept conceivable and a new notion thinkable even in the face of a system that refuses 
to recognize the visibility and voice of the defendant.   
II. Ethiopia’s Political Trials 
 
The use of the legal system for political ends is one of the signature traits of the EPRDF 
government. The judicial apparatus is mobilized against political adversaries with the 
                                                          
19
 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-76, (eds. Mauro 
Bertani and Alessandro Fontana), trans. David Macy, (New York: Picador, 2003), 26. 
20
 William Kunstler, Disturbing the Universe, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UL7Ct_ 
urpUY>, (Last accessed 12 February 2015). 
21
 Henning Grunwald, Courtroom to Revolutionary Stage: Performance and Ideology in Weimar Political 
Trials, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); See James Boyd White, Acts of Hope: Creating 
Authority in Literature, Law and Politics, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 278-87. 
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view to limit and circumscribe the space available for critique and political intervention.
22
 
Most political trials in Ethiopia are of the classic prototype, in which the government sets 
the trial mechanics into motion with the view to incriminate its foe’s political profile, and 
ultimately eliminating them from the political sphere.
23
 Since assuming state power, the 
government turned to its judicial apparatus to execute its repressive policies: to harass, 
intimidate, exile, dehumanize, and even expunge its enemies not only from the 
democratic public sphere but also from the historical record.
24
 Ever since the government 
observed the glittering rewards of political trials during the internationally sponsored Red 
Terror Trials, the judicial apparatus has become a crucial political space used, among 
other things, to dispose resistant elements within society, while validating and 
authenticating state action. Indeed, no spectrum of dissent has escaped this technology of 
repression since the Red Terror Trials. But unlike the events constituent of the Red Terror 
Trials, today’s Ethiopia conceals and renders its violence invisible and inaccessible 
through the invocation of open and indeterminate discourses of law and legality, rule of 
law and justice, and securitizing discourses and narratives. In particular, it is through the 
mobilization of its judicial apparatus, the same institution supposed to be above and 
beyond politics, that it forecloses the very possibility of political action. But how do we 
account for the disjuncture between the emancipatory promises of the constitution and the 
actual repression? 
 
The trials of the last two decades cannot be adequately understood in isolation from the 
relationships of inequality and domination that inaugurated the moment of foundation. 
Indeed, political trials are often surface manifestations of depth problem, the surface 
appearance of a long submerged crisis of sovereignty. The moment of the political trial 
marks the moment at which law’s rotten past, its exclusions and injustices, the 
dispossessions and repressions it underwrite, appear on the normative structure of the 
system. It signifies a moment at which the state turns to the law to, once again, suppress, 
contain, or manage the crisis that unsettles existing configurations of power from within 
its normative mainstay. Notwithstanding the democratic credential of the system, the 
mobilization of the trial process to eliminate a political foe signifies a deeper crisis and 
submerged problems that unsettle sovereignty from within its normative order. 
 
If we look beneath the formal structure of laws and institutions and the dissymmetry of 
power between the various ethnic forces in the national economy or the formal apparatus 
of the state, we will see that these trials are nothing but the surface manifestations of a 
much deeper moral and political crisis that cannot be explained without regard to the 
unequal force relation underneath the constitutive instrument. In order to preserve these 
unequal and hegemonic relations between the various ethnic groups or the power 
relations between those in power and those who seek to bring about change, Ethiopian 
authorities used the image of courts and the legal system to silence criticism and suppress 
                                                          
22
 Awol Allo, The ‘politics’ in Ethiopia’s Political Trials, Open Democracy, 30 November 2012; See also 
the Economist, Snatched: Justice and Politics in Ethiopia, 9 July 2014. 
23
 Awol Allo, Ethiopia: The War on Terror and the Trial of 28 Community Leaders, Open Democracy, 4 
March 2013. 
24
 These trials have the objective not only of disposing the political foe from the political sphere but also 
tarnishing the integrity and reputation of the individuals to the point of erasing their legacy from the 
historical record.  
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that founding inequality from being publicly seen, heard, and/or contested. In other 
words, this inequality and dissymmetry of force relations that can be seen in the 
institutional distribution of power, the usurpations and dispossessions that can be 
discerned in the political influence exerted by some ethnic nationalities, in the injustices 
and battle cries that continued to be heard beneath the generous proclamation of rights – 
all these injustices are being suppressed, managed, and contained through the 
instrumentality of the political trial. It is used to accuse, denigrate, condemn, and 
dehumanize the adversary.
25
 
 
Whatever the constitutional position of the Ethiopian judiciary, the latter is integrated 
into the official establishment as a functionary of the party and the government through 
both formal and informal arrangements.
26
 This total integration of the judiciary into the 
political field, the transformation of the judge into a functionary of the state, has two 
purposes: to predetermine the outcome of the trial and to harmonize judicial function 
with administrative policies. As the only party in charge of the prosecutorial machine, the 
integration of judiciary enables the government not only to stage manage the outcome of 
specific trials, but also to introduce new concepts and procedures that enables the 
government to mobilize the judicial apparatus in the future. Instead of being a house of 
justice elevated above and beyond the realm of politics, Ethiopian courts are hegemonic 
sites of power engaged in the production of what Rancière calls ‘infinite justice,’ – a 
justice in which all necessary distinctions crucial for its materialization are obliterated to 
guarantee the absolute invulnerability of the order.
27
 They are sites of ‘infinite justice’ 
where politics and justice, policing and war, law and fact, guilt and innocence, 
rehabilitation and retaliation, prosecution and judgment, are synchronized to produce 
maximum political rewards for the ruling party. Janne Portikivi refers to this form of 
justice as a justice that “ignores all the distinctions by which its practice is traditionally 
delimited”.28 All these vital distinctions central to the administration of legal justice are 
set aside in the interest of political expediency. Rather than being institutions of justice 
that operate according to predetermined judicial principles and presuppositions, the 
courts are now the government’s first line of defense in its struggle with the political 
opposition.  
                                                          
25
 A brief look at the terms of the pardon offered to those tried and released on pardon shows that 
Ethiopia’s show trial industry has the purpose of coercing its foes into capitulation and accepting a 
diminished self.  
26
 For example, in the case against Abubaker Ahmed and 28 others, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry, a 
quasi-judicial body responsible for receiving and examining petitions for constitutional interpretation, 
simply shelved the petition, while the High court rendered its own interpretation of the Constitution and 
proceeded with the trial. In doing so, the Council enabled the government to drag the defendants before 
its courts without embarrassing itself and its institutions. The existing constitutional arrangement is here 
used to contain and suppress the questionable legality of a repressive legislation used by the government 
to preserve its authoritarian hold on power.  
27
 For an account of ‘infinite justice’, see Jacques Rancière, Prisoners of the Infinite, trans. Norman 
Madarasz, available at < http://www.counterpunch.org/2002/04/30/prisoners-of-the-infinite/>, (Last 
accessed 20 January 2015). 
28
 Janne Portikivi, What is so funny about infinite justice, in Ari Hirvonen and Janne Porttikivi (eds.), Law 
and Evil: Philosophy, Politics, Psychoanalysis, (Abingdon, Routeledge, 2010), 200.   
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With the emergence of the ‘war on terror’ as an overriding preoccupation of the West and 
the indifference of its discourse to normative notions such as the rule of law and justice, 
Ethiopia redefined the ‘war on terror’ and situated its internal political struggles with its 
foes within the framework of counter-terrorism operations.
29
 By situating its repressive 
policies against legitimate political forces and critics within the framework of the global 
war on terror and by imputing the violent characteristics of terrorism to domestic political 
movements (and those exiled by the government), Ethiopia appropriates the global war 
on terror for a radically different end. The judicial apparatus is now used as a mainstream 
instrument of preservation and legitimation of the established relationship of domination 
and inequality among Ethiopia’s disparate political and social groups: the state regularly 
mobilizes repressive legislations to neutralize real or perceived foes from the political 
landscape, effectively colonizing the democratic public sphere.  
 
Just like the ‘fight against communism’ under Apartheid South Africa provided a cover 
for the Apartheid regime to perpetuate its racist violence, the ‘war on terror’ provided 
Ethiopia with a convenient discursive weapon, with which it lures both the West and a 
section of its society into tolerating its oppressive policies and practices. While Apartheid 
relied on the signifying power of anti-communism and its legal arm, the Anti-
Communism Act, to delegitimize, harass, and repress the opposition, Ethiopia uses the 
discourse of counter-terrorism and its notoriously broad anti-terrorism proclamation to 
achieve precisely the same goal and objective.
30
 Like the rhetoric of anti-communism, 
counter-terrorism is a discourse that conveniently marginalizes, delegitimizes, and even 
dehumanizes those accused of it and justifies the violence perpetrated against them by 
overstepping their legal rights.  
 
III. The 2005 Election: A Turning Point? 
 
Following the 2005 national election, the government introduced several legislative and 
policy measures intended to mute and paralyze democratic movements.
31
 Accusing all 
forms of democratic organizing and mobilization as reprehensible subversion, the system 
moved to preserve and defend “the legal rule of a minority” from being replaced by the 
rule of the majority.
32
 With the enactment of the anti-corruption proclamation, the 
coming into force of the revised criminal law (with a series of state crimes designed to 
reflect and protect the federal structure) and the progressive integration of the judiciary 
into the political field, the authorities redefined and circumscribed the political field and 
                                                          
29
 Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Stop Using Anti-Terror Law to Stifle Peaceful Dissent, 21 November 
2011.  
30
 Abigail Salisbury, Human Rights and the War on Terror in Ethiopia, available at http://jurist.org/forum 
/2011/08/abigail-salisbury-ethiopia-terror.php, (Last accessed 17 February 2015); See also UN experts 
urge Ethiopia to stop using anti-terrorism legislation to curb human rights – available at 
http://www.ohchr. 
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15056&LangID=E#sthash.Oz4XJQuP.dpuf, 
(Last accessed 15 February 2015). 
31
 Lovise Aalen & Kjetil Tronvoll, The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in 
Ethiopia, 120 Review of African Political Economy, (2009), 199-204. 
32
 Nicole Stremlau, The press and the political restructuring of Ethiopia, 5(4) Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, (2011), 727.  
9 | P a g e  
 
the nature of the struggle between the ruling party and the opposition. Between 2005 and 
2009, the most popular and performative devices of criminal law used by the government 
include: ‘outrage against the constitution,’ ‘obstruction of the exercise of constitutional 
powers,’ ‘inciting, organizing or leading armed rebellion,’ ‘endangering the integrity of 
the state,’ ‘impairing the defensive power of the state,’ ‘high treason,’ and even 
‘genocide.’  
 
With the adoption of the anti-terrorism proclamation
33
 and the Charities and Civil 
Societies Proclamation
34
 in 2009, Ethiopia completed the series of legislative measures it 
needed to sustain, preserve, and consolidate the regime. By codifying relationships of 
inequality and domination into laws, institutions, and the bureaucracy, it transformed 
inherently unequal relations into legal relations, rendering them rational, autonomous, 
objective, and independent of power and politics. These two legislative measures marked 
a significant rupture in the strategies, instruments, discourses, and spaces used for the 
preservation of existing relationships of domination and inequality in the past. Unlike the 
spectacles of horror unleashed against “counter-revolutionaries” during the Red Terror 
years, the last decade saw a worrying pattern of judicialization of repressive politics, not 
merely through coercive violence, but through the synchronization of violent techniques 
with notions and practices that act on the subject, and ultimately, totalize the political 
sphere itself. Today, violence and injustice are bureaucratized and rationalized. No longer 
material, visible, and palpable – violence became normative and epistemic. It is 
performed and perpetrated in the name of truth and justice – in the very iteration of ideals 
of equality and democracy, what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri refer to as ‘a perverse 
dialectic of the enlightenment.’35 In essence, the 2005 election marked the moment at 
which ‘the rule of a minority’ began to be relentlessly protected by law and its agencies 
from being challenged, contested, and criticized by the majority.
36
 
 
One of the most alarming developments of this strategic shift is the emergence of 
Stalinist show trials as the predominant instrument of preservation and power 
rationalization. Without any pretense, Ethiopian courts today eliminate real or perceived 
political foes of the regime, including opposition party leaders, journalists, activists, and 
bloggers, according to rules and processes put in place to guarantee the invulnerability of 
the order. High-profile conflicts with its opponents and critics are no longer arbitrated 
through physical violence: they are legalized and judicially adjudicated. By depoliticizing 
and submitting these conflicts to a presumably professional, neutral and impartial judge 
who arbitrate conflicts in the realm of reason and justice, the system secures the raw 
material that guarantees its vitality and continuity. By adjudicating these legalized 
inequalities and power relations, the court normalizes and pacifies a violent state that 
                                                          
33
 Committee to Protect Journalists, Anti-terrorism Legislation Further Restricts Ethiopian Press, 23 July 
2009; Roy Greenslade, Ethiopia uses anti-terror laws to silence critical journalists, The Guardian 
newspaper, 29 September 2011. 
34
 Sisay Alemayehu Yeshanew, CSO Law in Ethiopia: Considering its Constraints and Consequences 8(4) 
Journal of Civil Society, (2012), 375-77.  
35
 Antony Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 25. 
36
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 121. 
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actually bombs itself to blame its foes.
37
 By creating a dangerous and monstrous snapshot 
of the accused adversary, Ethiopian courts rationalize and justify the government’s 
narrative of the adversary and their consequent elimination as legal, legitimate, and 
therefore ‘just.’  
Finally, there is a thriving show trial industry haunting the Ethiopian justice system. 
These trials are not ordinary run-of-the mill criminal trials. They are unique juridico-
political events in that they tell a story whose spatio-temporal coordinates cannot be 
neatly delineated. These trials embody a distinctive affective story with special claim 
about law, the state and society. They engage and confront “events that occur beneath the 
State, that ignore right, and that are older and more profound than institutions”.38 They 
are trials that tell us stories of foundation, representation, and recognition. In them, we 
will find the raw materials for understanding the ways in which the legal order helps 
conceal, suppress or otherwise contain the disjuncture between the normative guarantees 
of the Constitution and violent practices. In what follows, we will discuss three major 
political trials that illuminate some features of Ethiopia’s show trial industry.  
 
1. The Red Terror Trial: Trial by Fiat of the Successor Regime  
 
Ethiopia’s Red Terror Trial is the quintessential example of a political show trial by fiat 
of the successor regime. Named after a particularly brutal episode in which euphemisms 
such as ‘revolutionary justice,’ netsa irmja (free action), ‘delivery without receipt,’ 
‘neutralization,’ and ‘special operation’ were used to rationalize and justify violence39, 
the Red Terror Trial had an ambitious juridico-political goals.
40
 It was designed to create 
and affirm the categories of accusers and accused, good and bad, violent and peaceful, 
and victors and vanquished. According to Human Rights Watch, a total of 5,198 
individuals were charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and homicide, of which 
2,246 individuals have been detained, while the remaining 2,952 were charged in 
absentia
41
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The Red Terror Trial was launched amidst great optimism and with the dual aim of 
historical instruction and normative reconstruction. According to the law establishing the 
Office of the Special Prosecutors
42
 (SPO) for the prosecution of members of the old 
regime, the former was formally tasked with ensuring accountability and establishing a 
public memory for the 17 years of violence perpetrated by the vanquished regime. Unlike 
many post-conflict transitional societies that confronted their violent past through either 
retributive or restorative justice paradigms, the Red Terror Trial was announced and 
legally proclaimed as an experiment in both retributive and restorative justice. However, 
like most trials by fiat of the successor regime, the trial degenerated into a spectacle of 
victor’s justice, abandoning its publicly stated purposes of ensuring accountability and 
constructing a permanent wall between the tyranny of the old regime and the promise of a 
new society under the rule of law. Instead of contributing towards reconstructing the 
social fabric and the making of a new society, the trial process deteriorated into a 
vengeful enterprise and an exercise in the construction of legitimacy for the new regime.   
The Red Terror Trial was designed to reconstruct the past as part of the project of 
establishing a public memory and an official history that would become a “possible 
weapon in the battle for political domination.” 43  This memory had to have been 
historicized and politicized in order for it to serve as a weapon in future struggles with 
other forces within the country. In order to do this effectively, the government needed to 
portray itself as committed to ensuring accountability and fighting impunity. At the same 
time, it sought to depict a murderous and violent image of the previous regime on par 
with some of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. In order to reinforce this 
view, the new regime tried the defendants for acts of genocide under the Ethiopian 
criminal law. Former President Mengistu Hailemariam and 72 other top-ranking officials 
of his regime were charged with 269 acts of genocide and other serious human rights 
violations. Two other groups comprised of military and civilian field commanders who 
carried out orders and passed them down the chain of command were charged with lesser 
crimes such as first-degree homicide.
44
  
Conveniently enough, the Ethiopian Criminal Code enforce since the reign of Haile 
Selassie I defines the crime of genocide as an act intended to destroy in whole or in part 
national, ethnical, racial, religious and political groups.
45
 Unlike the Genocide 
convention, the law protects political groups as well. Since the majority of the victims of 
the Dergue were students and political opponents, a conviction on genocide charges can 
easily be achieved under domestic law and domestic trial whose process and outcome the 
regime can fully control. By accusing its vanquished adversaries for the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community, by presenting itself as a system 
committed to the liberal ideas of human rights and the rule of law, the regime wanted to 
                                                          
42
Ethiopia: Reckoning under the Law, Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/12/01/ 
ethiopia-reckoning-under-law>, 1 December 1994, (Last accessed 12 December 2012). The Special 
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) was created with the mandate to investigate and prosecute "any person having 
committed or responsible for the commission of an offense by abusing his position in the party, the 
government or mass organizations" under the Dergue regime. 
43
 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 110. 
44
 Id. 
45
 The Penal Code of Ethiopia, Proclamation No 158/57, art. 281. 
12 | P a g e  
 
show both to the international and domestic audience the difference between the cruelty 
of the past and the promise of a new era of accountability and justice. 
In December 2006, some twelve years after the trials began, 71 high-level officials of the 
Dergue were found guilty of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. At the long awaited 
sentencing hearing, only 34 of the defendants were in court, while 25 were sentenced in 
absentia, and the remaining 14 had died during the lengthy process.
46
 Taking note of the 
defendants’ old age, the court passed a sentence of life in prison rather than the death 
penalty sought by the prosecutor. After serving a total of 20 years in prison, 16 of these 
high-level officials were pardoned in 2011.
47
  
 
The legacy of the Red Terror Trial is far from clear. Far from ensuring accountability and 
establishing public memory, the trial was tainted by the prosecution’s belligerent pursuit 
of an officially-sanctioned history and selective memory. Notwithstanding the brutality of 
the facts before the court and the symbolism of the individuals on trial, the trial failed in 
captivating the national consciousness as a significant historical event. Since the 
government was interested in the trial as a tool of political expediency and in the verdict 
as a signpost for the future, the trial failed in its stated objectives of historical instruction 
and normative reconstruction. Though the international community has lauded the 
Ethiopian government for its aggressive pursuit of accountability for crimes against the 
human condition, the trial was a huge disappointment for those who expected it to be a 
national cultural artifact in which the nation will recognize the ills of its past. Twenty 
years on, instead of the clean break promised by the Transitional Charter, the constituent 
instrument of the SPO and the FDRE Constitution, Ethiopia remained the same 
authoritarian state in which legal repression and disciplinary technologies of control 
complemented the physical violence of the past. While the government momentarily 
benefitted from the glittering rewards of the judicial theater and the excitement of the 
human rights community, this did not last longer.  
More than two decades after the government promised to mainstream and embed 
accountability by establishing “a public record of the atrocities for posterity,’ the Red 
Terror Trial archives still remained closed to the public. Even evidence presented in court 
remained closed to the public long after the verdict and the judgment entered history 
books. If one of the key goals of atrocity trials in transitional societies is providing 
finality and closure to the victims and the nation as a whole, the Red Terror Trial had 
failed in achieving this. To the contrary, the Red Terror Trial laid the foundation for the 
proliferation of political show trials, in which the courtroom emerged as a battleground 
for the creation, and recreation of images, narratives, and realities productive to the 
authorities. 
2. The Seye Abraha Trial:  “The Anticipation of Remote Consequences” 
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A bitter split within the executive committee of the Tigrean People’s Revolutionary Front 
(TPLF), the leading party in the ruling EPRDF coalition, triggered an internal crisis that 
necessitated the deployment of the judicial machinery against a prominent party member 
and ex-Defense Minister, Seye Abraha. The fiasco can be traced back to the 1998-2000 
territorial war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Several high-level officials and founding 
members of the TPLF Party of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi accused the Prime Minister 
of not heeding intelligence warnings about an imminent attack by Eritrea.
48
 
Consequently, the TPLF split into two camps—those who stood with the Prime Minister 
and those who questioned his leadership ability and loyalty to Ethiopia, led by Seye 
Abraha. As former comrades in arms, Zenawi and Abraha knew each other very well. 
Zenawi understands Abraha’s bent of mind and will power to be able to anticipate the 
consequences, however remote or proximate, of a rebellion that was likely to take down 
his party. To avert the possibility of a rebellion, Zenawi quickly engineered the dismissal 
of 13 members of the ruling party’s Central Committee who had opposed him, including 
Seye Abraha and General Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae —then army-chief of staff.49  
As a continuation of the same war by a legal means, Zenawi ordered the arrest and 
detention of Abraha for unspecified charges. After a prolonged pre-trial detention, he was 
charged with corruption, one of the most convenient legal devices available at the time.
50
 
Despite a ruling by the First Instance Federal Court—a competent court of jurisdiction 
with authority to examine and determine the merit of the case—ordering Abraha’s release 
on bail, Abraha was immediately rearrested as he left the courtroom under instruction 
from the Prime Minister.
51
 Within days, Abraha was back in a court facing trial in the 
Federal Supreme Court, while the judge who ordered his release, Ms. Birtukan Mideksa, 
was subsequently dismissed from her position.
52
  
Abraha faced two charges of corruption brought forth by the Federal Ethics and 
Corruption Commission, an institution that was established ex post facto.
53
 In the first 
case, Abraha was accused of using his status as a government official to unlawfully 
benefit family members, including his brother Miherete’ab Abraha who was also being 
tried.
54
 The second case against Abraha was for allegedly collaborating on illicit business 
dealings with former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Tamrat Layne, who was already serving 
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an 18-year jail term following an authentic political show trial that followed a coerced 
confession of the defendant in parliament. Layne claimed that government authorities 
tried to blackmail him to testify against Abraha and forced him to face trial again because 
he refused to do so.
55
 
During the trial, the Federal Supreme Court denied bail for the accused, citing an 
amendment of the law, which had established the Federal Ethics and Corruption 
Commission. The defendants challenged the decision arguing that this amendment was 
enacted after the First Instance Federal Court had already granted the right to bail for the 
accused.
56
 Moreover, the defense questioned the constitutionality of the law, maintaining 
that the right to bail is a constitutional right, which the court can only deny with regard to 
the specific circumstances of each case, not through a blanket law.
57
 Nonetheless, the 
Federal Supreme Court upheld its decision and detained the accused for six years 
throughout the duration of the trial.  
From the outset, Abraha’s trial was marked with a number of procedural irregularities 
including the denial of the right to presumption of innocence and other due process 
rights. In order to weaken Abraha’s power position within the party, the government 
needed a legal weapon to discredit and disrepute him—even remove him from the 
political space—while still preserving the pretense of legality and fairness. However, 
given the legal landscape at the time, the Prime Minister’s faction could not effectively 
situate its political conflict with the vanquished factions within the framework of the law 
without a post facto criminal law designed to eliminate a figure of extraordinary will 
power leading a rebellious group. As intended, the verdict removed the defendant from 
the political space and enabled the Prime Minister’s faction to reconstitute itself and 
restructure the party both at the local and the national level.  
In 2007, the court passed a guilty verdict against Seye Abraha, Miherete’ab Abraha and 
Tamrat Layne on one count of corruption, each. All of the defendants, except for Layne, 
were released on parole because they had served the majority of their jail sentencing 
during the trial.
58
 Even so, the trial had succeeded in defaming Abraha who maintained 
his innocence and argued that the case was a pretext to censure him for “political 
differences with the leaders.” Pointing out the hypocrisy and political nature of the 
charges, Abraha stated in court: “if there is corruption, it is Meles (Zenawi) himself who 
is corrupt.”59 Abraha alleged that the Prime Minister had stolen 2 million birr each year 
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for the past ten years and urged an audit of all Central Committee members’ accounts.60 
As usual, the court simply chastised Abraha for making ‘political statements’ during the 
trial.
61
  
The Seye Abraha Corruption Trial is a classic political trial that displays all the 
appearances of a carefully engineered political theater to silence dissent and opposition. 
To say that it was the classic political trial is not to affirm Abraha’s innocence but to 
claim that his trial is merely a mask for behind the scene political struggle between the 
two factions. Had it not been for the political conflict with the Prime Minister, Abraha 
would not have been the subject of a criminal investigation let alone a show trial. To 
sustain the invulnerability of the Prime Minister’s faction, the system needed to engineer 
a spectacle of legality, aimed not only at disposing the individual on trial but also at 
annihilating the juridical conditions for collective agency and resistance.  
 
3. The Treason Trial of CUD and Others: Opposition as Treason 
In May 2005, the EPRDF faced the most serious threat to its power when it emerged that 
the opposition had made significant gains in the parliamentary elections, taking all seats 
in the capital Addis Ababa. The ruling party moved quickly to declare victory before all 
votes had been tabulated, leading the opposition to accuse it of widespread vote rigging 
and crackdown on its supporters and activists. As the tension between the government 
and the opposition continued to rise, the government declared a state of emergency and 
banned all forms of demonstrations and gatherings. In the months that followed, massive 
protests broke out in various urban areas, resulting in the death of some 193 civilians.
62
 In 
late 2005, the government accused the main opposition party, Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) and arrested its leading members along with 3 civil society actors, 14 
journalists, and other individuals.
63
 
The government accused CUD leaders of undermining the constitutional order by, among 
other things, boycotting parliament, questioning the independence of the National 
Electoral Board, and the judiciary. In the government’s view, these are acts calculated to 
bring about disrepute on the legitimacy and credibility of state institutions and are part of 
a conspiracy by the opposition to overthrow the government.
 64
  Defendants were charged 
with some of the most explosive crimes available to the authorities: including genocide, 
treason, outrage against the constitution, and rebellion. As crimes against the state and the 
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collective existence, these offenses name and condemn crimes society regards as horrific 
and inexcusable. They “entered popular parlance as a powerful vehicle for expressing 
profound outrage at horrific atrocities.”65 By accusing defendants of these outrageous 
offenses against the collective existence, the government is signifying and imputing the 
cultural and political meanings that go along with these crimes to the accused. By virtue 
of their discursive operation, they generate meanings that far exceed their legal meanings 
and produce political effects.  
The majority of the defendants dismissed the case as a politically motivated charade and 
refused to enter a plea or mount a defense, while the three civil society defendants, 
Daniel Bekele, Netsanet Demissie, and Kassahun Kebede, sought counsel and entered a 
plea of not guilty to the charge of “outrage against the constitution”.66 After a two-year 
trial, the court passed a guilty verdict against defendants who refused to plea or mount a 
defense for the charge of “Outrages against the Constitution,” and sentenced all to 
death.
67
 Outside the courtroom, however, discussions have been underway to secure the 
freedom of the defendants. By the time the verdict was handed down, an agreement has 
already been reached to pardon the defendants in return for an unconditional admission of 
criminality and an unqualified apology to the government and the Ethiopian people.
68
  
Though pardon and amnesty serve symbolic functions in the social order, the pardon deal 
offered to these defendants is ironic at best: it is neither evidence of magnanimity nor an 
expression of a desire for reconciliation. It is intended (1) to give the government a way 
out of the impasse and (2) to shore up a highly contested and problematic verdict and 
penalty. Since pardon by definition presupposes an admission of wrong and a written 
confirmation of the assumptions and thoughts on which the verdict and the sentence is 
predicated, the same defendants who rejected the charge are forced to admit not only to 
the accusation but also the verdict and the sentence. In this way, the pardon serves to 
retroactively justify a questionable trial and vindicate the government’s narrative of 
events.  
When the pardon was presented to the accused, all but two of the civil society defendants, 
Daniel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie, accepted the offer. The two civil society leaders 
maintained their innocence and decided to fight off, claiming that “things will work out 
                                                          
65
 Lawrence Douglas, Perpetrator Proceedings, in The Trial on Trial, 197. 
66
 American Embassy Addis Ababa to U.S. State Department, “Trial of Ethiopian Opposition Begins With 
Videos,” WikiLeaks, cable:06ADDISABABA1402, 06-05-19 http://www.wikileaks.org 
/cable/2006/05/06ADDISABABA1402.html. 
67
 American Embassy Addis Ababa to U.S. State Department, “Ethiopia: Prosecution Recommends Death 
Penalty for CUD Leadership,” WikiLeaks, cable:07ADDISABABA2137, 07-07-09, accessed 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07ADDISABABA2137.html 
68
 Id. 
17 | P a g e  
 
according to proper legal procedures.”69 What follows is a detailed exploration of their 
engagement with the court.  
 
 
 3.1. The Case against Daniel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie     
Before the election night, civil society organizations were seen as crucial stakeholders 
both by the government and the opposition. This view changed dramatically in the 
immediate aftermath of the election as the government lost in areas where the civil 
society had strong presence. The tension between civil society and the government 
continued as opposition parties raised accusations of fraud, implying that the ruling party 
was unable to win in areas where civil society observers were present, but manipulated 
votes in their absence outside urban area. In the midst of the ongoing fracas over the 
election outcomes, the government linked civil society organizations with the opposition 
and accused them of engaging in purely political activities under the guise of civic 
neutrality.
70
 This culminated in the implication of the three prominent civil society 
leaders in the Treason Trial. The prosecution accused them of using the “cover of 
reconciliation” while operating “under the umbrella of the CUD to foster the 
conspiracy”.71 
The case against the civil society leaders rested on speculative reasoning that departs 
from the assumption that the accused are indeed members of the CUD. The evidence 
consisted of personal testimonies, documents, audio, and videotapes. Over 20 hours of 
videotapes showing opposition campaign speeches, press conferences and rallies were 
presented alongside substandard documentary evidence that lacked in the credibility and 
authenticity required of evidence in a criminal trial. Ninety-one documents, including a 
document the prosecution claimed was a CUD hit list of top government officials, and a 
plan to supply supporters with ammunition and correspondences showing intention to 
cooperate with the Eritrean government were submitted in evidence.
72
 However, none of 
these documents were substantiated in court. Only photocopies of the original documents 
were shown and there are no signatures or other means of verification to ensure that the 
documents had not been forged.
73
 For example, one piece of evidence brought against the 
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civil society defendants was a letter allegedly written by Elias Kifle—an exiled journalist 
and government critic—in which Kifle mentions that Hailu Shawel, the leader of the 
CUD, appointed Daniel Bekele and Netsanet Demissie as CUD communication 
officials.
74
 The defense easily refuted the letter by calling Mr. Shawel as a witness, who 
testified that he had neither known of nor met Daniel and Netsanet before the trial and 
never sought to collaborate with them.
75
  
A large part of the prosecution’s case was based on witnesses that many believed were 
“coached and coerced by the prosecution”.76 Those who testified attested that they had 
attended opposition rallies, where anti-government fliers were handed out, and meetings, 
during which the opposition called for an armed struggle and the use of violence against 
security forces.
77
 The credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, however, was called into 
question several times during cross-examination. In an account of the trial, Mariam 
describes an incident in which a prosecution witness admits on the stand that he was 
coached by the prosecution to commit perjury, raising serious concerns about false 
testimonies.
78
 Two key prosecution witnesses testified that Daniel and Netsanet had paid 
them to hand out anti-government fliers and mobilize youth and taxi drivers against the 
government. Yet, again, the prosecution witnesses’ accounts began to fall apart when 
interrogated by the defense. For example, when these two witnesses were asked the 
names of the individuals they mobilized, the content of the fliers that they had handed 
out, and the locations where they claimed they had hidden from police, both claimed that 
they could not remember any of this information.
79
  
The procedural irregularities were so grotesque that the scale of justice was extremely 
tilted towards the prosecution in ways that cannot be explained or justified with the orbit 
of law and legality. For example, the identities of prosecution witnesses were not 
revealed in advance, requiring the defense to conduct cross-examination without 
adequate preparation in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution, which guarantees the 
accused “the right to full access to any evidence presented against them”.80 The court also 
granted the prosecution’s request to allow submission of additional documents, many of 
which the defense claimed were falsified long after the trial had begun.
81
 Mariam notes 
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that in standard criminal cases in Ethiopia, judges should not allow the prosecution to file 
charges without sufficient evidence; however, in the Treason Trial, the court accepted the 
charges and gave the prosecution more time to search for additional evidence to support 
its case.
82
  
In a 2-to-1 decision, the bench decided that there was not enough evidence to convict the 
two defendants for the charge of “outrages against the constitution” but enough evidence 
to convict on another crime for which they were not tried: “Provocation to Commit 
Crimes Against the State”.83 While praising the civil society leaders for the work they did 
in the pre-electoral period and admitting that the defendants had proved that they were 
not at any time a part of the CUD party, the lead judge, nonetheless presented the guilty 
verdict based on the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses, maintaining that the 
defense had not disproved or addressed this piece of evidence.
84
 This makes the verdict at 
once innovative and groundless: there is no basis for convicting an accused for crimes 
with which they were neither charged nor were able to defend themselves against under 
the Ethiopian law. But in a political trial where the law serves as an instrument of power 
and the trial as an act of war, this is not beyond the realm of possibilities. Given the 
intense political interest behind the case, the judges have no alternative but to convict 
regardless of the facts of the case. As former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Donald 
Yamamoto, noted: “To hear the case presented by both the prosecution and defense 
leaves no room for question as to whether Daniel and Netsanet committed the crimes they 
were accused of – they were not guilty”.85 They were sentenced to 2 to 30 months in 
prison, 25 of which had already been served during the trial.
86
 
Interestingly, the conclusion of the legal case and the completion of their sentence did not 
end the political drama and their incarceration. Though many expected the defendants to 
be released on parole in the weeks after sentencing, they were denied parole. The 
prosecution threatened to either appeal the verdict or charge them with new crimes, 
unless they agree to a pardon deal like the rest of the Treason trial defendants in which, 
they will admit to the crimes and vindicate the government’s account of events.87 The 
defendants were told by a high-ranking official, via the Elders Council, that their freedom 
was contingent, not on the decision of the court, but on offering an unqualified apology 
and a subsequent pardon by the government. Seeing no other alternative and the prospect 
of a new trumped up charge, Daniel and Netsanet accepted the pardon, stating: “we will 
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sign anything that gets us out of prison.”88 They were finally released in March 2008 after 
signing a letter accepting the Federal High Court’s decision, apologizing for their actions 
and promising ‘not to engage’ in ‘illegal’ activities in the future.89  
By agreeing to the intractable and demeaning terms of the pardon, Daniel and Netsanet, 
like the other treason defendants, were compelled into a post-conviction confession. Far 
from being a symbol of moderation and reconciliation, the pardon enterprise in Ethiopia’s 
political trials is a vindictive technique that functions to vindicate the government by 
legitimizing and authenticating a questionable legal process. This confirmation of guilt 
and coerced expression of remorse is the final nail in the political opponent’s coffin, 
which he is ceremoniously forced to hammer in himself.  
Conclusion 
 
The government’s relentless and systematic perversion of discourses of truth and justice 
and the gradual transformation of its courts into the functionary of the state demonstrates 
the contempt with which the regime holds the very founding principles upon which the 
promise of the ‘new’ Ethiopia rested. By politicizing the judiciary and mobilizing it for 
hegemonic and oppressive political ends, the government failed in drawing a clear 
distinction between the moral failings of the past and the constitutional promises of the 
present. If the Red Terror Trial was an unsuccessful exercise in normative reconstruction 
and historical instruction, it is precisely because the government was not committed to 
those principles. To the contrary, the government saw the trial as a key site of knowledge 
production, order-legitimation and power-rationalization. They saw the trial as a critical 
opportunity to produce and filter horrific images of a lasting effect into the court of 
public opinion. While pretending to ensure the impunity of former regime officials who 
committed an attack against the human condition, the government perverted what was a 
novel enterprise into an infuriating obfuscation. Consequently, the Red Terror Trial only 
managed to provide a false sense of closure and finality to the nation and victims of that 
horrific episode.  
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